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Abstract
How important are national macroeconomic indicators for people’s satisfac-
tion with democracy? This paper empirically explores the link from macroe-
conomic variables to support for established democratic systems. We combine
country-level data on growth, inflation, and unemployment from the OECD
with survey data from the Eurobarometer for nine Western European countries
for the period 1976-2001. We regress individual satisfaction with democracy
on macroeconomic variables and individual controls. Our regressions include
country-specific time trends as well as fixed effects for countries and survey-
years. Pooling observations from nine countries, we find that growth (inflation
and unemployment) is positively (negatively) correlated with satisfaction with
democracy. The effect goes beyond what can be explained by individual char-
acteristics and is non-negligible if interpreted in light of the recent economic
crisis. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications using logit and or-
dered logit models.
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1 Introduction
The economic crisis that has evolved in consequence of the American subprime crisis
since 2007 brought political challenges and economic hardship to countries that had
become used to economic prosperity. Mass demonstrations took place in many cities
as people wanted to express their dissatisfaction with the situation and how it was
dealt with. In the context of the European debt crisis in summer 2010 the president
of the European Commission Mr. Barroso expressed his fear that “democracy might
disappear” in the most heavily affected Southern European countries; it was argued
that macroeconomic conditions could worsen to an extent that would be impossible
to deal with for governments and would therefore make them susceptible to popu-
lar uprisings (Groves, 2010). In an extension of the ‘responsibility hypothesis’1 we
indeed expect poor economic performance to weaken political backing by the pop-
ulation more generally. Survey data from the International Social Survey Program
supports the notion that citizens see governments responsible for welfare, growth,
employment and price stability (ISSP Research Group, 2008).
We use the crisis and concerns about democratic stability as an occasion to look
at the old question of how political support depends on economic conditions from
a new angle. It is very relevant to investigate this relationship again in the light
of current developments. In Ireland, for instance, per capita income has dropped
to the level of ten years ago and is expected to drop further (Bruton, 2010). Can
we learn something from the past about how this might affect citizens’ attitudes?
Our research is in the tradition of research on political support (see Norris (1999a)
for a comprehensive collection) but with democratic satisfaction we use an outcome
variable that has been used less often.2
We explore the importance of macroeconomic conditions for citizens’ political
support in stable, established democracies. In our analysis we rely on satisfaction
with ‘the way democracy works’ (SWD) as an indicator of political support.3 We
combine country-level data on growth, inflation, and unemployment from the OECD
with survey data for nine Western European countries for the period 1976-2001 from
the Eurobarometer and estimate how individuals’ attitudes towards democracy react
to macroeconomic variables.
1‘Voters hold the government responsible for economic events” (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000).
2We follow the conceptualization of political support along five dimensions by Norris (1999b):
political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, political actors.
Government popularity would refer to the most specific dimension of ‘political actors’ wheras
satisfaction with democracy is understood as an evaluation of ‘system performance’, a more diffuse
but nonetheless relevant aspect of political support.
3According to Dalton (1999) this gives us an instrumental evaluation of the performance of
democracy, which we argued above is one dimension of political support.
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Previous work using the same indicator, SWD, describes effects of institutional
quality (Wagner et al., 2009) and inflation and unemployment (Clarke et al., 1993)
on the satisfaction with democracy. But as it is common in cross-country compar-
isons these studies use data aggregated at the national level. Among the studies on
democratic satisfaction only two use individual level data: Halla et al. (2008) inves-
tigate the role of environmental policy for individuals’ satisfaction with democracy,
while Wells and Krieckhaus (2006) document an effect of corruption. Both of these
papers have the drawback of using only few points in time, which essentially limits
their inference to variation in the cross-section of countries. They do not take into
account changes in national economic conditions over time.
Since satisfaction with democracy is just another indicator, our analysis is con-
ceptually close to research on political support in general. One particularly broad
strand of the literature analyzes government popularity. It finds that voters eval-
uate macroeconomic outcomes retrospectively and vote accordingly in subsequent
elections.4 Revolutionary action or political extremism are likely to indicate the
absence of political support and are thus also of interest. Several papers look at
economic determinants of extremist behaviors: Brückner and Grüner (2010) find a
negative relationship between growth and right-wing extremist voting at the aggre-
gate level. A drawback of their approach is that they cannot control for individual
characteristics. Moving to the micro-level, Lubbers et al. (2002) show how sup-
port of extreme right-wing parties increases with unemployment. MacCulloch and
Pezzini (2007) provide evidence that the preference for revolution increases when
the economy performs poorly.
Earlier empirical work on the relationship between the economy and political
support has two important shortcomings: None of the above studies tests for the
influence of several macro-economic indicators at the same time and none uses a
long time dimension combined with individual level data. Results come largely
from cross-sectional variation or are based on aggregate data, which is the more
problematic, the more heterogeneous countries are in the sample, or the more crucial
individual characteristics are in determining democratic satisfaction.
In this paper we address these two shortcomings. We use a linear probability
model to regress individuals’ satisfaction with democracy on personal characteris-
tics and national macroeconomic variables. In contrast to the existing literature,
we use a sample of homogeneous countries and rely on over-time instead of cross-
country variation. Our analysis pools observations from several countries together
4This literature is very broad and we refer the interested reader to the survey on vote and
popularity functions by Nannestad and Paldam (1994).
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but exploits variation in country-specific economic conditions over time. The use
of individual-level data with a long time dimension allows controlling for important
factors at the individual level such as sex, income, education, and labor force status
and at the same time using country-fixed effects to abstract from cultural differ-
ences in political attitudes. We restrict our analysis to a set of nine EU countries for
the period from 1976 to 2001. By concentrating on established systems, we avoid
bias from changing institutions. Data stems from the Eurobarometer for individ-
ual characteristics (GESIS, 2008) and from the OECD (2010) for macroeconomic
indicators.
Our estimations indicate a significantly positive relation between growth rates
and scores of satisfaction with democracy (SWD). This result is robust to the inclu-
sion of individual controls, nation-specific time trends, and fixed effects for countries
and survey years. Inflation and unemployment exhibit negative effects on SWD. This
shows that results from previous studies, which did not systematically look at the
relevance of economic conditions but focused on one or the other indicator, carry
over to our more comprehensive approach. We go beyond previous research and show
that omission of either of these variables affects the other coefficients. Furthermore,
we find that macroeconomic conditions have an influence that goes beyond what is
measured by personal economic characteristics like individual income. This insight
is new compared to papers which restrict themselves to national aggregates.
The next section describes the dataset and in section 3 we present our empirical
model and the specifications we estimate. In section 4 we present our results fol-
lowed by some robustness checks in section 5 and discussion in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 Data
Our analysis combines survey data with national macroeconomic data for 24 years
in 9 countries. Individual level data was obtained from the Eurobarometer and
macroeconomic data from the OECD (2010). Descriptive statistics for all included
national and individual variables are displayed in tables 4 and 5 in the appendix.
The tables show that there is variation in our dependent variable ‘SWD’ as well as in
the explanatory variables ‘growth’, inflation’, and ‘unemployment’ within countries
over time. Figure 1 illustrates that SWD varies over time and across countries. It
also reveals that there are substantial differences in levels of SWD across countries
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possibly due to cultural specificities. The following paragraphs introduce the data
in more detail.5
The Eurobarometer data set is a repeated cross section of individuals in the
European Union. It starts with 5 countries in 1970; other countries are added when
they entered the European Union. In every round, about 1000 respondents per
country complete the questionnaires. As indicator of support for democracy we
used answers to the following question: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in
<country>?’.6 We refer to this as ‘satisfaction with democracy’ or SWD.
The variable SWD was collected for the first time in 1973 and then every year
from 1976 to 2001 except for the year 1996. We want to have the longest possible
time series and therefore restrict our analysis to the 9 European countries that were
included in the Eurobarometer for the entire period. These are France, Belgium, The
Netherlands, Germany (since 1991 including East Germany), Italy, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. We dropped observations from 1995,
where education was not recorded, such that our sample contains observations for
24 years.
Total GDP (constant prices), consumer price index and unemployment rates were
obtained from the OECD reference series, while GDP per head is part of the Annual
National Accounts. Unemployment rates are not available for 1976 for Spain and
for the years 1976 to 1991 for Germany. We approximated unemployment rates for
these country-year pairs by the ratio of total unemployment over population 15-64
years old from the OECD references series. We calculated growth as the relative
annual change in GDP (constant prices) and inflation as the percentage change in
the consumer price index.
3 Model Setup and Specification
In contrast to most of the related literature, we rely on micro-level data instead
of country averages. In our understanding this is vital because democracy needs
the consent of individuals–not only to be legitimate but also to ensure long run
stability. The individual’s attitude towards the system is a function of national as
well as individual characteristics and we have to rely on micro-level data to gain
insight into the drivers of individuals’ democratic support.
5Exact variable definitions can be found in table 6 in the appendix.
6<country> is replaced by the name of the country in which the respondent was interviewed.
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Figure 1: Percentage of individuals satisfied with democracy over time
We pooled observations from all countries together and implemented a linear
probability model to estimate the following equation:
SWDit = β0 +macrotβ1 + individualitβ2 + uit (1)
The dependent variable ‘SWD’ is a dummy derived from the question how satisfied
an individual is with the way democracy works in his or her country. It collapses
answers ‘very satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ into ‘satisfied’ (SWD=1) and answers
‘not very satisfied’ and ‘not at all satisfied’ into ‘not satisfied’ (SWD=0).7
We estimate different specifications of equation (1). All have individual satisfac-
tion with democracy as dependent variable on the left hand side but, on the right
hand side, we varied the vectors ‘macro’ and ‘individual’. We included inflation and
7While much easier to interpret, this binary recode ignores information on the strength of indi-
viduals’ democratic support and the linear model does not take into account the domain restriction
on the dependent variable. We estimated a logit model to address the latter concern and find very
similar results. For ease of computation and interpretation we report only results from the linear
probability model as is suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009). We also estimated an ordered
logit model using the original 4-point scale of SWD, which confirms our results from the binary
case. Marginal effects are strongest for the outcome ‘fairly satisfied’. Results are available upon
request.
6
unemployment at the national level because they have been proved influential in
previous studies (for SWD e.g. in Wagner et al. (2009), for right-wing extremism
Knigge (1998) and for general life satisfaction e.g. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005)).
As growth, inflation, and unemployment are correlated in our sample, including all
three is crucial to obtain reliable results on the effects of either of the three. At the
individual level we controlled for being unemployed and not being part of the labor
force, for income, education, sex, age, marital status, and personal life satisfaction.
4 Results
We first discuss the impact of the macroeconomic variables and then the effects
of individual level variables. If not indicated otherwise, all estimations are at the
invidual level and include country-fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends.
The latter control for trends in country-specific effects and are important because
SWD is in most (but not all) countries upward trending.8
4.1 Macroeconomic Variables
We included different macroeconomic indicators successively in addition to individ-
ual characteristics to shed light on the importance of each of them and the rela-
tionship between them.9 We find that per capita income has a significant effect but
the effect is partly mediated by other macroeconomic indicators (table 1). When
we included growth or inflation in addition to GDP, the coefficient is reduced by
almost half (columns 2 and 3) and becomes insignificant when we also controlled
for national unemployment levels (columns 4 and 5). An increase in per capita in-
come of US$1000 is associated with an increase in the probability of being satisfied
with democracy of about 0.7 percentage points in the specifications of columns 2
and 3. For standard deviations in per capita GDP of US$2000 to US$10000 , this
amounts to variations in satisfaction with democracy in the range of 1 to 7 percent-
age points. Since in the last columns GDP is insignificant we conclude that omitting
unemployment levels from the regression introduces a substantial upward bias to the
coefficient of GDP (columns 2 and 3).
Economic growth is always statistically significant. Without other macroeco-
nomic controls except for per capita income one percentage point higher growth
comes on average with a 1 percentage points higher probability of satisfaction (col-
8Results without trends are available from the authors.
9We used GDP per head as starting point because previous studies on happiness show that per
capita income is highly correlated with individual satisfaction, see e.g. Di Tella et al. (2003).
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Table 1: Impact of Macroeconomic and Individual Level Variables
on SWD (Individual Data)
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0115** 0.0066* 0.0067* -0.0086 -0.0084
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
growth 0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0090*** 0.0088***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
inflation -0.0001 -0.0053 -0.0082**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
uerate -0.0166*** -0.0151***
(0.004) (0.003)
individual characteristics
unemployed -0.1033*** -0.1033*** -0.1033*** -0.1021*** -0.0438***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008)
outoflf 0.0032 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032 0.0014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
married2 0.0112* 0.0111* 0.0111* 0.0113* -0.0098*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
educ 0.0042* 0.0042* 0.0042* 0.0042 0.0017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
male -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0037
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
age -0.0051*** -0.0051*** -0.0051*** -0.0052*** -0.0027**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rich 0.0372*** 0.0367*** 0.0367*** 0.0375*** 0.0229***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
poor -0.0340*** -0.0342*** -0.0342*** -0.0341*** -0.0135**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
satislfe1 -0.4086***
(0.037)
satislfe2 -0.3382***
(0.025)
satislfe3 -0.0809***
(0.006)
_cons 0.3619*** 0.3936*** 0.3938*** 0.7768*** 0.9225***
(0.091) (0.068) (0.068) (0.143) (0.131)
N 383634 383634 383634 383634 338783
R2 0.118 0.119 0.119 0.12 0.166
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All estimations include dummies for survey years, nations and control for country-
specific time trends.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
Dependent variable is a dummy.
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umn 2). When all three macroeconomic variables are included, growth obtains a
smaller coefficient than before (column 4). This is intuitive as unemployment and
inflation are both negatively correlated with growth in our dataset such that the
coefficient on growth is upward biased if we omit those. Still, the significance in-
dicates that growth had an influence in addition to what was captured by inflation
and unemployment. One hypothesis to rationalize this finding is that growth prox-
ies for expectations of income, inflation and employment in the future.10 When we
interpret the coefficients with respect to variation in the explanatory variable, we
find that a standard deviation increase above the mean in growth rates implies an
increase in SWD of about 2 percentage points.
An unemployment rate of one standard deviation above the mean comes with a
decrease of 5 percentage points in this probability. Inflation only exhibits a signifi-
cantly negative relationship with SWD when individual life satisfaction is controlled
for (column 5).
4.2 Individual Characteristics
We focus the discussion on columns 4 and 5 and describe first results for the speci-
fication without life satisfaction and then show how results change if we control for
it. We begin with individual unemployment: People being unemployed showed a
10 percentage points lower probability of being satisfied with democracy when life
satisfaction is not included. From column 4 it is evident that individuals’ view on
the democratic system was affected by macroeconomic and individual conditions at
the same time. That is, national unemployment was an important factor beyond
direct individual concernment.11 In contrast, those who were out of the labor force
did not evaluate democracy significantly differently than those who were employed.
Income exhibited a significantly positive effect on SWD. Those individuals who
belonged to the three lowest income deciles, the “poor”, were less satisfied with
democracy (about 3.4 percentage points) than those who belonged to the fourth,
fifth, sixth or seventh decile. “Rich” individuals, that is persons belonging to the
three upper income deciles, were more satisfied with democracy (3.8 percentage
points). Again Individuals with more years of education were more likely to express
satisfaction with democracy but the effect was only weakly significant. Respondents
who were married or stated to be “living as married” were on average more satisfied
10We address this hypothesis in section 5.1 in the context of the possible endogeneity of growth
rates.
11It does not necessarily follow that the unemployment rate reflects collective concerns of idividu-
als. It may well be the case that the national unemployment rate affects beliefs and/or expectations,
for instance with respect to future job security, social transfers, or tax rates.
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with democracy by 1.2 percentage points. Yet, the effect is only weakly significant.
The influence of age is negatively humpshaped. Older people were less satisfied with
democracy but the relationship reverses at some point in life. The effect of sex on
SWD was not significant.
In column 5 we added life satisfaction as another personal control variable. In
contrast to the other controls, it is not an objective measure but an attitudinal
statement: People were asked how satisfied they are with their lives.12 Life satisfac-
tion is an important factor in explaining SWD. Being not at all satisfied with one’s
life, translated into a probability of not being satisfied with democracy that is 40
percentage points higher than for a person that was very satisfied with his life. This
indicates a close link between the perceived personal situation and the view on the
democratic system. Life satisfaction is also correlated to most of the other individ-
ual characteristics: The coefficients of unemployment, education, age as well as the
income dummies, rich and poor, are smaller and the coefficient of married changed
sign when we controlled for life satisfaction (compare columns 4 and 5). This is not
suprising as socio-economic variables are known to influence life satisfaction (for an
overview see (Frey and Stutzer, 2002)).
These results imply that the effects of variables like unemployment, marital sta-
tus, and potentially income were overestimated when life satisfaction was not in-
cluded. The change in coefficients of macroeconomic variables was less drastic;
growth and unemployment remained significant and stayed similar in size. How-
ever, inflation became insignificant.13
To summarize our results, we find that growth, unemployment, and inflation
are all significant at the same time and also exhibit the expected signs. Further-
more, personal economic variables are significant and also show the expected signs.
The results indicate that national economic performance is important beyond di-
rect individual concernment. In addition to their current personal situations people
also take national performance into account when evaluating the political system.14
Moreover, personal life satisfaction has by far the strongest effect on SWD.
12Analogously to satisfaction with democracy there are four answer categories: 1=not at all
satisfied, 2=not very satisfied, 3=fairly satisfied, 4=very satisfied. We constructed dummies, where
‘satislfe1’ represents category 1, ‘satislife2’ category 2 etc. The omitted category is 4, people
indicating to be very satisfied with their life.
13Previous studies indicate that macroeconomic variables affect individual life satisfaction and
happiness (see Deaton (2008) or Di Tella et al. (2001)). So, as for individual variables changes of
coefficients from column 4 to 5 could be due to the omission of life satisfaction.
14As already noted in footnote 11 the significance of macroeconomic variable does not necessarily
imply a collective motive. Macroeceonomic variables may be solely important because they affect
beliefs and expectations about individual well-being.
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5 Robustness
In this section we address two important issues to demonstrate the robustness of
our findings. First, we investigate the importance of lagged macro variables for
our results and possible reverse causality issues. Secondly, we present results from
estimations at the aggregate level. This facilitates the comparison of our results
with findings from previous studies which often relied on aggregate data.
5.1 Lagged Growth Rates and Endogeneity
Growth rates from previous periods may be influential in addition to contempora-
neous rates because real effects need time to materialize. Thus, we tested whether
lagged growth rates have an impact on SWD. We also included future growth rates
to address a potential endogeneity problem. The significance of growth rates is
robust to both exercises.
First, column 1 in table 2 shows that the coefficients of macroeconomic variables
remain similar when we control for lagged growth rates (see column 5 in table 1).
The coefficient of growth hardly changes (0.85 instead of 0.88), the coefficient of
unemployment decreases, and the coefficient of inflation increases in size. This
is intuitive as the development of unemployment rates as well as inflation is at
least partly determined by economic development and thus lagging behind.15 As
lagged growth rates did not gain significance, we did not include them in any other
regression.
Secondly, one obvious objection to our model is that not growth has an incluence
on SWD but instead higher satisfaction levels lead to better economic performance.
To address this issue we show that growth remains significant when we include fu-
ture growth (column 2). Future growth obtains a highly significant coefficient which
is even larger in size than the coefficient of contemporaneous growth. While this
might be due to reverse causality it could also be caused by serial correlation of
growth rates. A third explanation is that future growth proxies for growth expec-
tations which have a positive effect on satisfaction scores. These expectations may
be influenced by growth forecasts and media reports. Since our data does not allow
to control for expectations we cannot distinguish these hypotheses.
Importantly, the coefficient on future growth rates absorbs correlation between
SWD today and growth tomorrow. Thus, the coefficient of growth reflects only
contemporaneous correlation between SWD and growth. This is more likely to be
15If we omit lagged growth and it has a positive influence on employment today and a posi-
tive influence on satisfaction, then the coefficient on unemployment is downward biased because
unemployment has a negative effect on satisfaction. The argument for inflation is analogous.
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an effect from growth on SWD than the reverse. Since growth still obtains a highly
significant coefficient we feel assured that our results are not a pure artefact of
endogenous growth rates.16
5.2 Aggregate Level Regressions
Analyses at the country level cannot inform about how individual satisfaction scores
are formed but have to collapse either the ordered data to an average or a binary
recode to a percentage measure of support. Changes in these national averages
can come by various channels and are less likely to be informative than an analysis
with data at the individual level. However, as a robustness exercise we neglected
the individual dimension of our data set and checked whether there is a relationship
between satisfaction with democracy and macroeconomic conditions at the aggregate
country level. These results can then be compared with previous studies on SWD
that used country averages over time as observations (e.g. Wagner et al., 2009).
We used the year-wise country averages of the SWD dummy as dependent variable,
which represents the percentage of people who are satisfied with democracy in a
given year in a country (see table 3).17
The results are consistent with studies by other authors and our own findings.
If we look at columns (1) to (3), growth is significantly positive. A one percentage
point increase in growth is associated with an increase in the share of the population
stating that they are satisfied with democracy of about 0.8 percentage points. In
the full specification (column 4), however, growth is only weakly significant. Most
likely the upward differential in the coefficient of growth (columns 3 to 4) comes
from higher growth capturing also the impact of reduced unemployment on demo-
cratic satisfaction.18 An increase in national unemployment of 1 percentage point
decreased satisfaction with democracy by 1.6 percentage points on average. Com-
paring aggregate estimations (column 4, table 3) with our individual-level approach
(column 5, table1), it becomes evident that coefficients have the same sign but partly
differ with respect to size and also significance. Only the coefficent of unemployment
does not change. We conclude that analyzing the relationship between the macroe-
conomy and SWD at the individual level gives additional insights as compared to
aggregate studies.
16We are working on an extension of the dataset to cover the years until 2008, covering the
beginning of the economic crises. This would give us exogenous changes in growth rates.
17When we use average satisfaction scores instead of the average over SWD-dummies as depen-
dent variable, growth is again significant. Results are available upon request.
18If unemployment rates change mainly because of changes in economic growth, then it is even
informative to look at regressions with growth only.
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Table 2: Lagged Growth and En-
dogeneity
dependent: SWD (1) (2)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head -0.0093 -0.0052
(0.006) (0.006)
growth 0.0085*** 0.0068**
(0.002) (0.002)
inflation -0.0080** -0.0076*
(0.004) (0.004)
uerate -0.0138** -0.0143***
(0.005) (0.003)
growthlag 0.0034
(0.004)
growthfut1 0.0079***
(0.002)
individual characteristics
unemployed -0.0438*** -0.0441***
(0.008) (0.008)
outoflf 0.0013 0.0013
(0.005) (0.005)
married2 -0.0098* -0.0098*
(0.005) (0.005)
educ 0.0017 0.0017
(0.002) (0.002)
male 0.0036 0.0037
(0.003) (0.003)
age -0.0027** -0.0028**
(0.001) (0.001)
age2 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000)
rich 0.0228*** 0.0225***
(0.005) (0.005)
poor -0.0135** -0.0136**
(0.006) (0.006)
satislfe1 -0.4083*** -0.4083***
(0.037) (0.037)
satislfe2 -0.3380*** -0.3378***
(0.025) (0.025)
satislfe3 -0.0808*** -0.0806***
(0.006) (0.006)
_cons 0.9384*** 0.8456***
(0.128) (0.134)
N 338783 338783
R2 0.1661 0.1664
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All estimations include dummies for sur-
vey years, nations, and control for country-
specific time trends.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering
at nation level.
Dependent variable is a dummy.
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Table 3: Impact of Macroeconomic Variables on per-
centage SWD (Country Panel)
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
growth 0.0083*** 0.0084*** 0.0079*** 0.0048*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per head 0.0041 0.0050 -0.0019
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
inflation -0.0020 -0.0070**
(0.003) (0.003)
uerate -0.0155***
(0.003)
constant 0.4395*** 0.3592*** 0.3672*** 0.5741***
(0.040) (0.084) (0.085) (0.092)
N 269 260 260 260
R2 0.8796 0.8795 0.8797 0.8914
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All estimations include dummies for nations and survey years and
country-specific time trends.
Dependent variable is the average of the SWD-dummy in a given coun-
try.
6 Discussion
We begin with a discussion of the economic relevance of our results. Furthermore,
we provide a critical review of satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of system
support.
6.1 Relevance of Results and Implications
The coefficients and marginal effects we estimated are based on annual data. Thus,
what we report are effects of economic conditions on SWD per year. In the light of
the Financial Crisis our results suggest that on average, satisfaction with democracy
should have decreased by non-negligible numbers. For example, the real growth rates
for 2009 were -7.6 for Ireland, -5% for Italy, and still -4.2% for the European Union
on average (European Union, 2010) implying a decrease in SWD of about 3.7 to
6.7 percentage points when we use the coefficent from column 5 in table 1. This
would imply a decrease by up to one fourth of average satisfaction in Italy and
a decrease by almost ten percent for Ireland. However, the economic downturn
stretches over more than one period. We cannot say how SWD would change if
macroeconomic conditions are poor over longer horizons. It is possible that people
adapt to worsening economic conditions such that their satisfaction is on average
affected less than if there is only a short downturn. It is, however, also imaginable
that individuals become increasingly dissatisfied if the macroeconomy fails to recover
for several years.
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Moreover, different macroeconomic indicators and their effects can be inderde-
pendent and it is as yet not understood in which way. We have shown that per capita
income, growth, inflation, and unemployment are all significant if we include current
period measures. It might still be that further lagged or future values show different
correlation patterns, a question which goes beyond our micro level approach and is
rather an issue for macroeconometric research.
Our analysis documents the impact of objective individual variables like unem-
ployment and income but also the strong influence of perceived personal life satisfac-
tion on SWD. At the same time, our results point out that macroeconomic variables
are simultaneously important. We are not able to distinguish whether this is because
people evaluate the economic development from a collective national perspective or
whether the influence of national variables merely reflects individual concernment
via expectations and/or beliefs.
Abstracting from the problem of disentangling the channels, a tentative implica-
tion of our results for economic policies can be drawn. Economic policy that results
in good economic performance will increase peoples’ political support directly via
national economic performance and indirectly when it materializes at the individ-
ual level. However, the most important factor in explaining SWD, life satisfaction,
cannot be easily addressed by economic policy in an obvious way.
6.2 SWD and Alternative Dependent Variables
Our main contribution in this paper is to extend existing research on SWD by
combining micro and macro level approaches. As outlined in the introduction SWD
is one established measure of political support which is widely used and available
for a long time series. However, it is not an indisputable indicator. In the following
we will provide a critical review of SWD.
To begin with, we are aware that for most countries in our sample the political
and the economic system are mingled and do expect people to evaluate both jointly.
This is unproblematic for our analysis because it is the attitude to the existing sys-
tem that we are interested in. As Linde and Ekman (2003) point out, SWD may
be problematic for another reason: People may attach different dimensions to ‘the
way democracy works’ and answers will then measure the contentment with the
democratic idea for some respondents or satisfaction with incumbent government
performance for others while even disagreement with capitalism for others.19 There-
19It is not clear, empirically, how valid this critique is. Looking at the relationship between
economic crisis and support for markets and democracy in Latin America Graham and Suktahnkar
(2004) find that in their evaluation of democracy respondents do distinguish between democracy
as a system of government and the manner in which particular governments are performing.
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fore, our results should not be interpreted too specifically as results on satisfaction
with democracy but more as findings about political support more broadly defined.
Peoples’ vote intention for right wing parties could be another measure of political
support since it represents support for antidemocratic groups (as done in Knigge
(1998)). Alternatively, one could also use individuals’ preferences for revolution to
overturn their societies as a measure of the absence of political support (MacCulloch
and Pezzini, 2007). The taste for revolution, however, is less appropriate with respect
to the sample of established democracies we consider.
The use of subjective questions as dependent variables has been criticized by
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and, thus, it might appear optimal to use be-
havioral indicators of democratic support instead of SWD or vote intention. Yet,
a behavioral outcome that is a universal, cross-country valid indicator for (anti-)
democratic attitudes is hard to define. One obvious starting point is actual voting
behavior and political participation. Given that elections take place normally every
four to five years this would reduce our sample size substantially. Additionally, for
which party you cast your vote or whether you vote at all also depends on the ‘sup-
ply’ of parties, i.e. on the availability and programmes of parties in your country,
and strategic considerations. It would be interesting to extend our analysis to other
indicators of political support but this is beyond the scope of this paper and left for
future research.
7 Conclusion
This paper explored how people’s support for democracy depends on national eco-
nomic performance. We took this question to the individual level and combined
individual-level survey data on SWD (Eurobarometer) with macroeconomic data
from the OECD. Our sample covers France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom from 1976 to 2001.
Our results indicate that growth, inflation, and unemployment matter indeed.
Annual GDP growth rates below average were associated with an increase in the
percentage of respondents stating that they were not satisfied with the way democ-
racy works. Inflation and unemployment had the opposite effect: Higher values
were associated with a decrease in satisfaction levels. For drops in growth rates as
experienced by European countries during the recent crisis, our estimates predict
that satisfaction scores could decrease substantially.
While in line with previous work, our analysis uncovered important new aspects.
First, we included growth, inflation, and unemployment simultaneously and together
16
with individual level controls. All three macroeconomic indicators were found sig-
nificant at the same time. This implies that omission of either of those is likely to
bias results because neither is a catch-all measure for economic performance. Fur-
thermore, we showed that individuals did not only react to prices and employment
indicators but also to growth. Secondly, we showed that the impact of the macroe-
conomy went beyond what could be explained by personal affection as captured
through income, employment status, or life satisfaction. With respect to future re-
search, this last point raises the important question, why macroeconomic variables
are influential, how they affect individuals’ beliefs, and whether they evaluate the
system from a collective perspective independent of their own situation.
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APPENDIX
A Data Definitions and Descriptives
Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Macro Variables
MACRO FR BE NE GEa IT LU DE IR UK all
GDP per headb 20.48 21.63 22.28 20.59 20.38 34.37 22.62 15.81 20.53c 22.05
(2.70) (3.30) (3.68) (3.29) (3.29) (10.42) (3.49) (6.05) (3.30) (6.51)
growth (%) 2.49 2.31 2.66 2.49 2.52 4.66 2.32 4.96 2.43 2.90
(1.34) (1.64) (1.53) (1.58) (1.73) (3.06) (1.93) (3.26) (1.91) (2.23)
inflation (%) 5.46 4.04 3.30 2.90 8.76 4.02 5.46 7.30 6.46 5.31
(4.32) (2.60) (2.26) (1.74) (6.04) (2.88) (3.66) (6.14) (5.15) (4.51)
uerate (%) 7.89 8.12 6.13 5.06 8.60 1.68 6.14 12.00 8.20 7.21
(2.04) (1.78) (2.40) (2.27) (2.14) (0.85) (1.59) (4.33) (2.36) (3.41)
#observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 249
Standard deviations in brackets below estimates.
Calculations use only the years used for the regressions, i.e. 1976-1994, 1997-2001.
Sources: OECD, for details see table 6.
aSince 1991 East-Germany is included. Before data refers only to West-Germany.
bGDP per head in US$1000, constant prices, constant PPPs, reference year 2000.
cIn UK GDP per head available only for 22 years.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for the Individual Variables
IND FR BE NE GE IT LU DE IR UK all
satisdmo 2.40 2.45 2.71 2.61 1.96 2.89 2.87 2.62 2.49 2.53
(.80) (.83) (.72) (.75) (.78) (.74) (.77) (.86) (.85) (.83)
swddummy .51 .54 .67 .61 .24 .75 .74 .63 .55 .57
(.50) (.50) (.47) (.49) (.43) (.43) (.44) (.48) (.50) (.49)
unempl .06 .07 .04 .07 .05 .12 .05 .07 .06 .6
(.24) (.25) (.21) (.26) (.22) (.11) (.23) (.26) (.25) (.24)
outoflf .41 .44 .51 .40 .49 .48 .37 .46 .42 .44
(.49) (.50) (.50) (.49) (.50) (.50) (.48) (.50) (.49) (.50)
married2 .66 .65 .69 .61 .59 .65 .67 .58 .65 .64
(.47) (.48) (.46) (.49) (.49) (.48) (.47) (.49) (.48) (.48)
educa 4.82 4.89 5.14 4.29 4.04 5.01 5.29 4.14 3.57 4.50
(3.09) (3.02) (3.14) (2.94) (3.45) (2.99) (3.40) (2.73) (2.64) (3.10)
male .50 .51 .48 .48 .49 .52 .50 .50 .49 .49
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50)
age 42.02 43.53 42.35 44.58 42.62 42.74 44.19 44.43 43.71 43.13
(17.54) (17.90) (16.96) (17.40) (17.61) (17.00) (17.87) (17.82) (18.26) (17.68)
left .64 .45 .54 .55 .70 .50 .43 .34 .43 .51
(.48) (.45) (.50) (.50) (.46) (.50) (.50) (.47) (.50) (.50)
right .36 .55 .46 .45 .30 .50 .57 .66 .57 .49
(.48) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.46) (.50) (.50) (.47) (.50) (.50)
poor .28 .25 .29 .29 .30 .25 .30 .20 .23 .27
(.45) (.43) (.46) (.45) (.46) (.43) (.46) (.40) (.42) ( .44)
middle .35 .27 .35 .34 .28 .30 .35 .24 .30 .31
(.48) (.44) (.48) (.47) (.45) (.46) (.48) (.43) (.46) (.46)
rich .19 .19 .22 .22 .20 .17 .21 .14 .17 .19
(.39) (.39) (.41) (.41) (.40) (.38) (.41) (.35) (.38) (.39)
satislife1 .06 0.03 0.01 0.03 .07 .01 .01 .04 .03 .04
(.25) (.18) (.10) (.17) (.26) (.12) (.08) (.21) (.18) (.18)
satislife2 .18 .11 .05 .16 .21 .06 0.03 .10 .10 .12
(.38) (.32) (.22) (.37) (.41) (.23) (.18) (.29) (.29) (.32)
satislife3 .62 .58 .49 .64 .59 .53 .37 .51 .55 .55
(.49) (.49) (.50) (.48) (.49) (.50) (.48) (.50) (.50) (.50)
satislife4 .14 .28 .44 .18 .13 .40 .59 .35 .32 .30
(.34) (.45) (.50) (.38) (.33) (.49) (.49) (.48) (.47) (.46)
#obs.b 41668 41095 43369 58929 44978 16475 42933 40807 55082 385336
Calculations use only observations from the years used in the regressions, i.e. 1976-1994, 1997-2001, and observa-
tions where all variables used in the regressions are not missing.
Standard deviations in brackets below estimates.
Source: Eurobarometer.
aThis approximates additional years of education above a country-specific threshold.
b#observations varies slightly for some variables. For satislife1-4 #observations decreases by
approximately 10 %.
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